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ARTICLES 
PRIMA PAINT PUSHED COMPULSORY 
ARBITRATION UNDER THE ERIE TRAIN 
Richard L. Barnes* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article asks what remains if you sever part of a contract that was a 
nullity. If a contract is a legal nullity, it would seem intuitive that any lesser 
part would amount to nothing as well. In Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin 
Manufacturing Co.,1 however, the Supreme Court held that federal law 
demanded severability of an arbitration clause, even when a party claimed 
that the entire contract (including, therefore, the agreement to arbitrate) was 
void—in that particular case, due to fraud in the inducement. Specifically, 
the Court held, “[A] federal court is instructed to order arbitration to 
proceed once it is satisfied that ‘the making of the agreement for arbitration 
or the failure to comply [with the arbitration agreement] is not in issue.’”2 
The peculiar calculus of the Court is a result of a federal norm favoring 
compulsory arbitration clauses. While the federal norm encourages the 
salvage of an arbitration provision, state common-law doctrines that limit 
contract power suggest that the same compulsory arbitration provisions may 
be vulnerable to charges of adhesion or unconscionability. Can the value of 
enforcing a compulsory arbitration provision be so great that the arbitration 
clause will retain its force despite the destruction of the encompassing 
contract? While the common law answer would seem to be “no,” a series of 
Supreme Court cases appears to urge “yes.”3 This article argues principally 
that the Supreme Court was wrong when it found a remainder in Prima 
Paint. By doggedly favoring arbitration, the Court has reawakened concerns 
thought to have been put to rest by Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins.4 
                                                                                                                 
 *  Professor of Law and the Melvin Distinguished Lecturer in Law, University of Mississippi 
School of Law. LL.M. 1983 Northwestern University, J.D. 1979 and B.A. 1976 University of 
Arizona. My thanks and deep appreciation to Michael Gorman, University of Mississippi Law 
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 1. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 2. Id. at 403. 
 3. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1983); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Prima Paint, 388 
U.S. 395; Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1955). 
 4. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937). Erie was the end of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 
1 (1842), with the latter’s notion that there is a federal general common law separate from and 
possibly even above that of the states. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79. 
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Because federal substantive law includes the Federal Arbitration Act of 
1925 (FAA)5 and state substantive law includes doctrines of adhesion and 
unconscionability,6 there are two quite different norms to apply to 
challenges to contracts with arbitration clauses. The Court’s articulation of 
the FAA norm is that arbitration is the proper forum because the parties 
have chosen it.7 Classical contract doctrines, however, require an 
examination of the entire contract to properly judge the enforceability of the 
compulsory arbitration clause,8 which the common law would view as just 
another contract provision. Both norms rest on entrenched substantive law 
and only come into conflict in the limited scenario of a contract containing 
a putative compulsory arbitration clause. The way Supreme Court holdings 
have brought together these different and unrelated norms results in 
heightened conflict. However, this article argues that this conflict can be 
reduced by proper federal deference to state common law, the kind of 
deference suggested by Erie. Unfortunately, even fairly recent Supreme 
Court opinions do not indicate an inclination by the Court to move in this 
direction.9 
Supreme Court cases, by urging severance of the arbitration clause and 
then enforcing it, have formed a counterintuitive position. The arbitrator 
will receive challenges to the whole contract, including those based on 
classical contract doctrines. The trial court, on the other hand, will retain 
only challenges to the clause itself. State courts will be limited to inquiries 
about the arbitration provision’s validity, while the arbitrator receives 
sweeping challenges to the entire contract. 
Three illustrations will serve to highlight the surprising range of 
situations in which these norms will clash. As you read through each, please 
keep in mind that, in the absence of a compulsory arbitration clause, the 
trial court would have all issues of formation and defects in bargaining 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000). 
 6. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 934 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (“[W]e have previously held that state law adhesion principles may not be invoked to 
bar arbitrability of disputes under the [Federal] Arbitration Act.” (quoting Cohen v. Wedbush, 841 
F.2d 282, 286 (9th Cir. 1988))). 
 7. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1983); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); Prima Paint v. 
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 
(1955). 
 8. See, e.g., Rentways, Inc. v. O'Neill Milk & Cream Co., 126 N.E.2d 271, 273. (“A cardinal 
principle governing the construction of contracts is that the entire contract must be considered.”). 
 9. The 2006 case Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna attempted to resolve the conflict 
by stating that the federal arbitration norm was one of pre-eminent importance. See Buckeye, 546 
U.S. at 446. Buckeye held that if there is a challenge to a contract as a whole, the arbitration 
provisions of that contract are enforceable and severable from the contract, and the validity of the 
entire contract must be considered by an arbitrator. If the challenge is specifically against the 
arbitration provisions, then those specific provisions are considered instead by a trial court. See id. 
at 448–49. 
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before it. If the FAA is applied the way the Supreme Court now reads it, 
those challenges must be referred to the arbitrator. 
One: suppose you go to a travel agent and purchase a cruise. The price 
is set, your cabin, meals, and entertainment packages are reserved, but 
while the price is paid, it is understood that the tickets will not be issued for 
a number of weeks. When they arrive in the mail, they contain a provision 
exculpating the cruise line for negligence, lack of seaworthiness and even 
intentional torts by its crew. Obscure language also states that all terms are 
nonnegotiable. If unacceptable, your sole choice is to cancel, but the price is 
nonrefundable. Should you have any dispute about quality or service you 
must arbitrate the matter in Florida. You live in Seattle, Washington.10 Post-
Buckeye, the arbitrator will decide if the exculpatory clause is binding. 
Two: suppose instead that you, a resident of New Mexico, are in the 
market for a new home computer. You call a toll free number and order a 
$600 computer using a credit card. It arrives. Included is a “warranty” that 
states any defects or dissatisfaction with the terms can be remedied by 
return of the computer in its original condition, shipping paid by you, 
within 48 hours. Beyond this time you must arbitrate any dispute in Illinois 
with all arbitration fees and expenses borne by you.11 Post-Buckeye, the 
arbitrator will decide if the limited warranty is binding. 
Three: suppose instead that you use your ATM card to remove $200 
from your Tucson, Arizona bank. As you return to the car you are met by a 
polite, but insistent, masked bandit. While pointing a handgun at you, she 
hands you a piece of paper and says, “Sign this and hand over the cash or I 
will shoot you.” You comply. She gives you a copy of the paper which 
purports to be an “agreement.” In part, it provides for a waiver of all 
intentional torts and crimes. It states that this ‘waiver’ is in return for 
“entertainment provided.” Any dispute must be arbitrated in New York at 
your sole expense.12 Post-Buckeye, the arbitrator will decide the effect of 
the waiver. 
The Court has come to this counterintuitive position through a series of 
cases headlined by Prima Paint ,13 Southland Corp. v. Keating,14 and 
Buckeye.15 These three together will be used to outline the evolution of the 
                                                                                                                 
 10. This hypothetical is inspired, loosely, by the facts of Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 
499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
 11. This hypothetical is inspired, loosely, by the facts in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 
1147 (7th Cir. 1997) and Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 12. This hypothetical is wholly fictional, although the nature of the contract as one of voidable 
fraud in the factum or the like is apparent in the positive law of the U.C.C. See U.C.C. § 3-
305(a)(1) cmt.1 (discussing defenses that make an instrument a nullity, such as infancy and 
extortion “at the point of a gun”). 
 13. See Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 14. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 15. See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006). 
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doctrine and establish the Court’s current position. On the other side of the 
normative fence is the principle of federalism and the constitutional value 
of deference to state authority on matters of state law. Erie16 will be used to 
ventilate the possibility that the Prima Paint line of cases has gone too far 
to establish a norm favoring arbitration. 
A. ERIE R. R. CO. V. TOMPKINS 
Erie arose out of a negligence claim for injury on the railroad’s 
property caused by the railroad’s equipment.17 Under Pennsylvania law, 
mere negligence would not have been allowed as a basis for the claim, as  
that state’s law required wonton or willful conduct.18 Since there were no 
allegations of wonton or willful conduct, the railroad sought a dismissal. 
The plaintiff parried by asking the federal court to determine what the local 
law should be under the Swift v. Tyson doctrine, and in doing so, to apply 
the simple negligence standard.19 
The Erie court overruled Swift v. Tyson.20 Erie held that federal courts 
are not free to exercise independent judgments concerning what they 
believed to be a state’s common law.21 Rather than some “transcendental 
body of law outside of any particular state,”22 in diversity cases federal 
courts must apply the state’s law as articulated by the state’s legislature and 
courts.23 The common law should be that of the state where the federal 
court sits rather than some general, federal common law.24 
Thus, when a federal court seeks to apply common-law contract 
doctrines such as adhesion or unconscionability, or even the test of whether 
an invalid term is severable from the entire contract, the Court should apply 
the understanding of the state’s substantive law. There is no proper federal 
common law to apply.25 
B. PRIMA PAINT AND ITS PROGENY  
The slide away from Erie’s deferential federalism began in Prima 
Paint’s relatively benign holding. The majority concluded that the FAA 
applied to a sale of a paint business since this was a transaction in interstate 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937). 
 17. Id. at 69. 
 18. Id. at 70. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Id. at 79–80. 
 21. Id. at 79. 
 22. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. Although expressed in terms of negligence liability, this federalism principle seems 
to control in any discussion of common-law contract doctrine. 
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commerce.26 As part of that contract, the parties had agreed to arbitrate any 
controversy.27 The FAA was held to demand that the federal court order 
arbitration once it was satisfied that the making of the arbitration agreement 
itself was not in controversy.28 By limiting the holding to admiralty and 
interstate commerce cases, the Court constrained the sweep of this novel 
idea of the “separability”29 of the arbitration clause. It did not have to deal 
with the issue of which substantive rules should apply in diversity cases.30 
The Court viewed its holding as an invocation of the FAA’s principles to be 
enforced under the interstate commerce clause power, and therefore in this 
case, federal substantive law was applied to a federal question in a 
commerce clause setting.31 
The jurisdiction of the federal court to order arbitration was grounded in 
Congress’ express authority to regulate interstate commerce as evidenced 
by the FAA itself. It was not an acceptance of Congress’ power to regulate 
contracts in the broader, common law, sense.32 In the Court’s view, 
Congress could compel arbitration as a procedure in order to foster 
arbitration in admiralty and interstate commerce cases.33 Had the doctrine 
become quiescent at this point, less controversy would have come from it. 
Southland, our second pertinent case, picked up from Prima Paint. The 
Court stated that “The Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of 
Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.”34 After 
describing the plenary nature of the Interstate Commerce Clause power,35 
the majority said the Act was one intended to apply to state as well as 
federal suits. The Court held that California’s attempt to foreclose 
arbitration in franchise investment agreements violated the Supremacy 
Clause even though the California statute was intended only to reach 
California lawsuits brought in California state courts.36 By doing so, the 
Court extended the Prima Paint holding to state courts and what started as a 
rule to constrain federal courts in matters of federal substantive law became 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 (1967). The business served 
at least 175 customers in several states. Id. 
 27. Id. at 398. 
 28. Id. at 400. 
 29. Id. at 403. The idea was first offered by the Second Circuit in Robert Lawrence Co. v. 
Devonshire, 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), and cert. dismissed, 
364 U.S. 801 (1960). 
 30. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405.  
 31. See id. at 403. 
 32. See id. 
 33. Id. The stinging dissent by Justice Black refutes this illogical conflation of the question of 
federal power to regulate commerce with the more limited congressional power to create federal 
law that will then be applied in diversity cases. Id. at 411. 
 34. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1983). 
 35. Id. at 11–13. 
 36. Id. at 16 & n.11. 
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a constraint on state courts applying state common law and statutory rules 
of general import. 
The culmination of this line of cases occurred in Buckeye. In Buckeye, 
the plaintiffs brought a class action suit in Florida state court.37 The Florida 
Supreme Court had applied Florida law.38 Under Florida law a defense of 
unlawfulness, if proved, voided the entire contract.39 The plaintiff had 
alleged, among other violations, usury, which tainted the entire contract and 
called for its complete negation including the arbitration clause. Therefore 
the Florida Court reasoned that state law prohibited sending it to an 
arbitrator as required by the FAA, since that clause was of no legal effect.40 
The Supreme Court reversed. For the majority, the result was dictated 
by combining the holdings of Prima Paint and Southland.41  Prima Paint 
made arbitration a substantive rule in which the clause could be separated 
from all other considerations, and Southland made that rule of substance a 
part of state law.42 The action of the court should have been stayed pending 
arbitration unless the arbitration clause itself was put in issue, in which case 
the court could have retained the case for the limited determination of 
arbitration clause validity.43 The Buckeye rule went from a substantive 
federal provision in federal matters, to a federal common-law principle that 
displaces state statutory and common-law doctrines such as voidness and 
severability. Now part of the federal substantive law with its Supremacy 
Clause power, this principle must override any Florida rule the Florida 
Supreme Court wishes to apply.44 
The damage to Erie and preemption principles should be obvious. The 
FAA has become a substantive rule of a federal common law applied in 
virtually all settings and levels of the state and federal systems. It 
established a separability doctrine45 that essentially eliminates the common 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). 
 38. See Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2005). 
 39. See id. at 863. 
 40. See id. at 865. 
 41. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445. 
 42. The Court stated: 
Prima Paint and Southland answer the question presented here by establishing three 
propositions. First, as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration 
provision is severable from the remainder of the contract. Second, unless the challenge 
is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the 
arbitrator in the first instance. Third, this arbitration law applies in state as well as 
federal courts. 
Id. at 445–46. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. at 446–47. See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 
411 (1967). 
 45. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 411. 
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law doctrines associated with void/voidness distinctions and their attendant 
severability doctrines.46 
Because Erie ended the general federal common law and particularly 
the notion that such a law might be superior to state common law,47 the 
Supreme Court lacks constitutional authority to prescribe or preempt 
common law rules for state courts. This would include these doctrines as 
well as the doctrines of adhesion and unconscionability. 
Herein lies the Erie problem: Without Buckeye and its severability rule, 
the place to challenge the deal or any part of the deal is in court. When 
severed, the arbitration clause imposes arbitration only by self-reference. 
The common law lacks a neutral rule that would send the deal to the 
arbitrator. By declaring the preeminence of the FAA policy favoring 
arbitration, the Court seems to have done exactly that which was prohibited 
by Erie: It has created what amounts to a “law derived from judicial 
decisions rather than from statutes or constitutions.”48 
However, the language and holding of Buckeye have induced fictions 
and doctrinal wandering by the lower courts.49 The present state of 
understanding has encouraged some courts to apply both state contract-law 
doctrines and the Court-suggested severability of the arbitration provision 
in good faith. Other courts, however, have continued to manipulate the 
doctrines—chiefly by discouraging arbitration.50 Buckeye urges the trial 
court, whether federal or state, to take a nullity, parse it, and reanimate one 
of those components. The only way the contract is referred to the arbitrator 
is by dent of the compulsory arbitration provision itself. 
Clearly, Congress could have prescribed rules for maritime, 
international, Indian and interstate commerce matters, but there is no 
evidence in the FAA of such an intent. Neither does there exist support for 
the claim that the Court would be without power to interpret the FAA in 
such a way to implement such rules. To this point the Court has offered a 
limited holding: the FAA demands a severability doctrine, a constructive 
gloss, to protect the policy of arbitration. This article will show that this 
announcement by the Court was an unnecessary and unfortunate 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 447. 
 47. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1937) (“Except in matters governed by the 
Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the 
State. . . . There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive 
rules of common law applicable in a State. . . . And no clause in the Constitution purports to 
confer such a power upon the federal courts.”). 
 48.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ABRIDGED 221 (7th ed. 2000) (defining common law). 
See also Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“There is no federal general common law.”). 
 49. See infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 50. See, e.g., Martz v. Beneficial Mont., Inc., 135 P.3d 790, 796 (Mont. 2006) (Cotter, J., 
dissenting) (urging, albeit implicitly, that counsel plead arbitration cases carefully so as to permit 
judicial review). 
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aggregation of power that should have been more carefully considered. The 
Buckeye rule, if not a direct violation of Erie’s rule, founders on its 
interstitial principles. ‘Severability’ has encouraged lower courts to damage 
the common law from which it was drawn. 
II. THE PRIMA PAINT/ BUCKEYE LINE OF CASES AND THE 
CIRCUIT SPLIT 
In Prima Paint,51 Flood and Conklin (“Flood”) sought to enforce a 
compulsory arbitration provision in their agreement with Prima Paint 
(“Paint”).52 The agreement in this case was ancillary to the sale of Flood’s 
manufacturing business to Paint.53 Three weeks after the sale, the parties 
signed a consulting agreement that contained an arbitration clause.54 As 
with many agreements containing compulsory arbitration provisions, there 
was much more to the agreement than a commitment to arbitrate. The 
consulting agreement was an elaborate statement of the personal services to 
be performed by Flood’s chairman and included duration and non-
competition terms.55 Among the other provisions were payment terms and 
contingencies for financial problems.56 In sum, it was a detailed expression 
of the parties’ entire understanding related to the consulting agreement.57 
The parties agreed to a broad arbitration clause with a mandate to arbitrate 
any dispute in the City of New York using the rules and procedures of the 
American Arbitration Association.58 
After a dispute arose resulting in cross claims of breach, fraud and 
varying interpretations of the duties owed by Flood to Paint, Flood served a 
notice of intent to arbitrate.59 Paint responded with a suit in the District 
Court of New York and Flood moved the Court to stay, pending 
arbitration.60 The District Court granted this motion to stay; Paint appealed 
and the Second Circuit dismissed the appeal.61 The Supreme Court took the 
petition for certiorari, in part to resolve a conflict between the Second and 
First Circuits over who should resolve a claim that the entire contract was 
affected by fraud in the inducement.62 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 52. Id. at 398. 
 53. Id. at 397. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Prima Paint, 388 U.S at 397–98. 
 58. Id. at 398. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 398–99. 
 61. Id. at 399. 
 62. Id. at 402–03. 
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In its holding, the Court limited its opinion to cases of interstate 
commerce where the federal court was applying federal law.63 It held that 
federal law demanded the separability of the arbitration clause.64 The Court 
believed that interstate commerce cases alleging fraud in the inducement of 
the arbitration clause and brought in federal court under federal jurisdiction 
belonged in federal court, in accordance with the FAA.65 The Court 
reasoned, “[I]f the claim is fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause 
itself—an issue which goes to the ‘making’ of the agreement to arbitrate—
the federal court may proceed to adjudicate it.”66 
This suggests three categories of potential challenges: (1) challenges to 
the enforceability of the arbitration clause itself on grounds that attach only 
to the clause; (2) challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration clause 
itself on grounds that attach to both the clause and the contract as a whole; 
and (3) challenges to the contract as a whole, which if upheld would include 
the arbitration clause, on the sole ground that it is a part of the 
unenforceable whole. Fairly read, the holding of Prima Paint says that the 
third category must go to the arbitrator. That is, as a matter of federal 
principle, any impact of the unenforceability of the whole contract has to be 
“separated” from the impact to the arbitration agreement. In simple terms, 
the arbitrator should decide the issue of the whole contract’s 
unenforceability. This conclusion led to considerable confusion in the 
country’s lower courts.67 
There are circuit court opinions from the First,68 Second,69 Third,70 
Fifth,71 Sixth,72 Eighth,73 Ninth,74 and Eleventh75 Circuits that deal with the 
                                                                                                                 
 63. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 405–07. 
 64. Id. at 402–04 & nn.8 & 11. The Second Circuit, in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire 
Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), created the idea of a “separable” arbitration clause. 
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402 n.8. 
 65. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403. 
 66. Id. at 403–04. 
 67. Some twenty years later, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), the court 
extended this federal rule to litigation in state courts and applied Prima Paint’s concept of 
separability to the case. Then twenty years after Southland, in Buckeye, the Court applied the 
separability test in the context of a common-law challenge to the entire contract as void because of 
illegality on usury grounds. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). 
The Southland and Buckeye extensions of Prima Paint have caused a more problematic split than 
that supposedly resolved in Prima Paint. 
 68. Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 69. JLM Ind., Inc., v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 70. Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 71. Wash. Mut. Fin. Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2004); Primerica Life Ins. 
Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2002); Rojas v. TK Commc’ns, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 
1996). 
 72. Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky., LLC, 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001); Stout v. J.D. 
Byrider, 228 F.3d 709 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 73. Madol v. Dan Nelson Auto. Group, 372 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2004); Houlihan v. Offerman & 
Co., Inc., 31 F.3d 692 (8th Cir. 1994). 
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question of how to separate the issue of arbitration clause enforceability 
from the issue of the validity of the entire contract. Almost all of these 
opinions were decided between the 1983 Southland decision and the 2006 
Buckeye decision. Buckeye, which reversed the Florida court’s use of the 
common-law distinction of “void/voidable,” appeared to have resolved 
much of the split.76 
Prior to Buckeye, a distinct majority of circuits had held that the real 
issue was not the “void/voidability” distinction, but whether the challenge 
was to the arbitration clause itself, or whether the challenge merely infected 
the clause due to attacks on the whole contract.77 Nonetheless, some circuit 
courts had allowed a weakness of the whole to be the grounds for attacking 
the arbitration provision.78 The result was that those courts that had looked 
to state law for such distinctions as “void” and “voidable” were now 
required to decide if any state doctrine limiting the contract as a whole 
would be relevant in assessing a challenge to the arbitration clause.79 
Buckeye’s rejection of the “void/voidable” distinction, though offered 
on the basis of federal policy, is likely to fragment judicial opinion about 
how to handle challenges that are directed at both the arbitration clause and 
the entire contract. Buckeye appears to demand that the state courts now act 
in a way contrary to traditional common-law doctrines.80 By refusing the 
“void/voidability” distinction, the Supreme Court eviscerated the common-
                                                                                                                 
 74. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Ticknor v. Choice 
Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 75. Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 400 F.3d 868 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 76. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446 (2006). 
 77. Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 400 F.3d 868 (11th Cir. 2005); JLM Indust., 
Inc., v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2004); Wash. Mut. Fin. Group, LLC v. Bailey, 
364 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2004); Madol v. Dan Nelson Auto. Group, 372 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2004); 
Burden, 267 F.3d 483. Decisions in the Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
found that state law determined whether a contract was void or voidable, and if void that the 
Prima Paint holding would not apply.  Although refusing to accept in full the logic of its sister 
circuits, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the logic of not requiring a referral to an arbitrator if the 
contract was a nullity. Burden, 267 F.3d at 488. 
 78. See Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2003); Burden, 267 
F.3d at 488–89; Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2001). Some 
of the difference can be accounted for in the distinction between void and voidable contracts. See 
Burden, 267 F.3d at 488–89 (citing cases supporting the distinction from the Third, Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, although the court chose not to adopt the distinction). This 
distinction was specifically rejected by Buckeye. See Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 448. 
 79. There is also the issue of the split between the highest state courts and the federal circuits. 
Although rejected in Buckeye, it is apparent that Florida views the matter quite differently. 
Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 446. Also, Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv. Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 
689–90 (Cal. 2000) shows that California would be in line with Florida. The RESTATEMENT (2D) 
OF CONTRACTS, § 163 (1981), is strong evidence that most common-law courts would fall in line 
with the void/voidable distinction used by Florida, as well as the thoughtful approach of California 
in Armendariz. 
 80. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 696. There were important contractual, legal and equitable reasons 
for this result. Id. 
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law doctrine of severability. Buckeye’s rule was no longer the basic 
“separability” rule articulated in Prima Paint; it became an Erie violation 
that demanded state law accommodation of what is now a federal general 
law competitor. The ‘zero minus a part leaves something rule’ of Buckeye 
demands major adjustments in the common law. These will be taken up 
below in the context of Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare 
Services, Inc. and Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc.81 It becomes clear that a 
more sensitive reading of Erie principles demands a zone of deference for 
these common-law rules and, if observed, the zone would obviate the 
problematic zero-sum game of Buckeye. 
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE NORM OF ARBITRATION PROMOTION: 
THE FAA AND BUCKEYE LINE 
A. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
The FAA should be placed in its historical context. Passed in 1925, the 
FAA came thirteen years prior to Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, which reversed 
the Swift v. Tyson line of cases.82 The Swift v. Tyson line had encouraged 
federal courts to think of themselves as somewhat removed from the state 
law principles and doctrines present in cases of diversity of citizenship.83 
Therefore, at the time of the FAA’s passage, the notion of a federal 
common law and a strong procedural basis had not yet suffered Erie’s blow. 
The FAA was probably one attempt to ameliorate these tensions 
between state and federal common law that continued to build and 
eventually led to Erie. Federal courts were as prone to prejudice against 
arbitration as the state courts. There was a long history of denying effect to 
arbitration agreements, even in the face of carefully negotiated bargains by 
similarly situated parties. The ability of federal courts to articulate doctrines 
and principles on behalf of the state, free of the constraints of stare decisis, 
exacerbated the hostility toward arbitration: A federal judge could find state 
doctrines and principles to deny arbitration and, even if faced with some 
discomfort because of the doctrine favoring arbitration, could fashion a 
response that was hostile by looking at more general principles and 
speculating about the development of the law generally rather than 
examining the law particular to the state and the facts at bar. The federal 
courts saw in the FAA a Congressional response  
inten[ded] . . . to create a new body of substantive law relative to 
arbitration agreements affecting commerce or maritime 
transactions. Thus we think we are here dealing not with state-
                                                                                                                 
 81. See discussion infra Parts IV.A, IV.B.1. 
 82. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). 
 83. Id. at 74. 
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created rights but with rights arising out of the exercise of the 
Congress of its constitutional power to regulate commerce and 
hence there is invoked no difficult question of constitutional law 
under Erie.84 
Having limited the development of Swift v. Tyson rules, at least within 
the purview of its power to regulate maritime and interstate commerce,85 
Congress’s actions effected a shift in the viewpoint of some courts.86 
Hostility towards compulsory arbitration was no longer as fashionable.87 In 
diversity jurisdiction cases, that shift worked a change for some states as 
well. 88 
A remaining question was whether the FAA had also created an 
impediment to traditional doctrines that limited the availability of 
arbitration. The face of the statute made plain that while Congress intended 
a welcoming attitude toward arbitration, it did not aim to set aside those 
traditional limits. The validating provision of the FAA is Section 2, but 
even it makes it clear that validity is mandated “save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”89 In other 
words, as long as a court treats arbitration agreements as it would any other 
consensual provision, it can consider legal or equitable limits on the 
bargain. Even if the result is one that invalidates the arbitration clause, it is 
acceptable if the court reaches its conclusion after an even-handed 
application of doctrines and principles that it would apply in good faith to 
other provisions of the contract. So the question became the relative status 
of arbitration as compared to such limiting doctrines as adhesion and 
unconscionability. Cases beginning with Prima Paint and continuing 
through Buckeye endeavored to solve this puzzle. Ultimately, however, they 
further muddied the waters. 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. 
granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), and cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). 
 85. Section 2 of the FAA provides: 
[A] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction 
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such 
a contract, transaction or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 86. See Grand Bah. Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 550 F.2d 1320, 1324 (2d 
Cir. 1977). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See infra discussion Part IV.A. 
 89. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
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B. BUCKEYE’S NORMS 
John Cardegna and Donna Reuter were Florida residents who filed a 
“putative class action” in a Florida trial court.90 In part they alleged that 
violation of Florida usury laws and consumer protection provisions made 
their agreements with Buckeye criminal and void. Buckeye moved to 
compel arbitration of these issues and the trial court refused, holding 
instead that resolution of the validity issue was a matter for the court. On 
appeal, the Florida Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and said that 
under Florida law the issue of validity was for the court to decide, in order 
to prevent arbitration “breath[ing] life into a contract that not only 
violate[d] state law, but also [was] criminal in nature.”91 
The Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court, noting two 
types of challenges to the validity of the agreement under Section 2 of the 
FAA.92 One type challenges the agreement as a whole: in this case, the 
entire set of terms that governed the advance against deferred presentment. 
The other challenges the arbitration term itself.93 The Court extended the 
holdings of Prima Paint94 and Southland95 to state four rules: (1) as a matter 
of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable 
from the remainder of the contract; (2) unless the challenge to validity goes 
to the arbitration clause itself, the arbitrator is to consider the contract’s 
validity in the first instance; (3) this substantive law of arbitration applies to 
state as well as federal courts; and (4) “[B]ecause respondents challenge the 
Agreement, but not specifically its arbitration provisions, those provisions 
are enforceable apart from the remainder of the contract. The challenge 
should therefore be considered by an arbitrator, not a court.”96 
Buckeye offers a serious impediment to courts that wish to apply 
substantive state law doctrines of adhesion and unconscionability. Should a 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). As a part of each 
“deferred-payment” transaction with Buckeye, “they [the drawers] received cash in exchange for a 
personal check in the amount of the cash plus a finance charge.” For each transaction, they signed 
an arbitration agreement drafted by Buckeye, the payee, which was included in the “Agreement” 
between the parties. Id. at 442. 
 91. Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860, 862 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Party 
Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 121, 123 (2000)). 
 92. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 447. 
 93. See U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (2004), which distinguishes between “agreement” as a bargain 
between parties, and a “contract.”  A “contract” is the legal obligation between parties arising as a 
result of the agreement under the U.C.C. and other laws. U.C.C. § 1-201(12) (2004). This notion 
of “agreement” in the Code, and therefore all 50 states, for this commercial paper transaction 
(covered by Article 3 of the Code and by the Article 1’s general provisions) demonstrates the 
uncertainty faced by the Court. Although the preemption argument makes Florida law largely 
irrelevant, whether Congress intended to displace common-law and Uniform law concepts of 
“agreement” and “contract” remains questionable. 
 94. Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 95. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 96. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445–46. 
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court wish to apply these doctrines to a contract that contains a compulsory 
arbitration clause, it can do so only if the challenging party claims the 
clause itself must fail because it was negotiated by adhesion or 
unconscionability. The impediment is a product of the Court’s attempt to 
paint Buckeye as a simple deduction from the Prima Paint and Southland 
decisions.97  
The Court “reaffirmed” that, regardless of the identity of the court as 
state or federal, a challenge to the contract in its entirety must first be 
presented to the arbitrator.98 This led to a counterintuitive position: The 
arbitrator hears challenges to the whole contract, including those based in 
classical contract theory and doctrine. State courts steeped in classical 
contract doctrines such as illegality, fraud in the factum, discharge in 
bankruptcy and the like are presumably in the best position to consider 
challenges to a contract—or a clause in it—based on these classical contract 
doctrines. But they may only consider challenges to the clause itself! These 
contract doctrines treated the presence of any such deficiency as having 
negated the entire contract. If the product of illegality or fraud in the 
factum, it was as if the contract had never existed. The common-law 
doctrine of severability was nonexistent in this context, although the word 
“severable” could be found in classical doctrine in other closely allied 
concepts.99 As a result, contextual consideration, not severability, was the 
classical norm. 
A look at the history of adhesion and unconscionability in the Supreme 
Court decisions before Erie, as well as the common law developments 
before that case, will allow us to see that the norm of contextual 
consideration is so well established that it demands Erie deference today. 
IV. THE NORM OF CONTRACT LIMITATIONS: ADHESION AND 
UNCONSCIONABILITY IN THE COMMON LAW 
As a pre-Erie statute, the FAA can be assumed to include contract 
doctrines that the Court had established as substantive rules prior to its 1925 
enactment. In other words, the FAA simply added to the pre-Erie landscape 
and became just another part of the federal substantive law. In dealing with 
common carriers, insurance policies and towage contracts, the Court 
handled the types of fact patterns that led to the standard form or ‘off the 
rack’ provisions which the merchants wrote for themselves and their 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See supra note 42. 
 98. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 449. 
 99. See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 3.30 (2001) 
(discussing mitigating doctrines to the requirement of definiteness in a contract, including that “if . 
. . only part of the agreement is indefinite, the remaining part may be regarded as ‘divisible’ or 
‘severable’ and may be enforced according to its terms”). 
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customers.100 As such they were very much within the mainstream of 
adhesion and unconscionability developments of the general law of 
contracts in the nineteenth century. 
Perhaps the best illustration of the Court’s pre-Erie understanding of 
the limits on form contracts imposed by common-law doctrines, such as 
adhesion, is New York Central Railroad Co. v. Lockwood.101 In Lockwood, 
the Court held that a common carrier could not validly exempt itself from 
liability for its own negligence.102 Lockwood, traveling along with his 
livestock on a train, was injured as a result of the carrier’s negligence.103 
Lockwood brought a claim to recover damages for his injuries, and the 
carrier sought to defend itself by arguing that its “contract” with Lockwood 
absolved it of liability for its own negligence. 104 
The signed “contract,” in the form of a “pass,” stated that Lockwood 
and his livestock were traveling at their own risk, and it declared that 
acceptance of the “pass” was a “waiver of all claims for damages for any 
injuries received on the train.”105 The carrier argued that these terms were 
absolute in their meaning, and therefore such terms must be construed to 
exempt the carrier from liability for all injuries, including those caused by 
the carrier’s own negligence.106 The Court vigorously disagreed and refused 
to allow the carrier-drafted pass to exculpate the carrier for its own 
negligence.107 This attempt to excuse the carrier’s negligence was seen as 
repugnant to the law and anything but just and reasonable.108 The Court 
stated that this principle, especially when taken together with the bargaining 
inequality of the parties, the compulsion placed on the customer to accept 
the contract, and the duty of the carrier to act with reasonable care, operated 
with full force to render the terms at issue void and unenforceable.109 
Essentially then, the Court found that the alleged bargain was 
unenforceable, not only because it was unjust and unreasonable, but also 
because it lacked the essential element of voluntary assent.110 
                                                                                                                 
 100. See, e.g., R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 376–77 (1873). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 384. 
 103. Id. at 357–59. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 357. 
 106. Lockwood, 84 U.S. at 362–63. 
 107. Id. at 381–84. 
 108. Id. at 381–82. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 268 (1902). By way of contrast, in Baltimore & Ohio 
Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voight, 176 U.S. 498, 507–514 (1900), the Court upheld a contract exonerating a 
railroad carrier from all liability, including for its own negligence, to a particular passenger. 
However, in that case, the Court found it determinative that the passenger in question was not an 
ordinary passenger, but rather an express carrier that held a position of equal bargaining power 
with the railroad, freely entered into the contract, and received the benefits of the contract. Id. 
Similarly, in Sun Oil Co. v. Dalzell Towing Co., 287 U.S. 291, 292–95 (1932), the Court held that 
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Without categorizing with language of adhesion or unconscionability, 
the Court found the contract to be violative of sound policy.111 The analysis 
sounded very much like classical adhesion tests, however. First, “[t]he 
carrier and his customer [did] not stand on a footing of equality.”112 The 
customer was one of millions who could not afford to haggle or stand out 
from the crowd.113 The Court stated: 
If the customer had any real freedom of choice, if he had a 
reasonable and practicable alternative, and if the employment of the 
carrier were not a public one, . . . then, if the customer chose to 
assume the risk of negligence, it would with more reason be said to 
be his private affair, and no concern of the public. But the condition 
of things is entirely different and especially so under the modified 
arrangement which the carrying trade has assumed. The business is 
mostly concentrated in a few powerful corporations, whose position 
in the body politic enables them to control it. They do, in fact, 
control it, and impose such conditions upon travel and 
transportation as they see fit. . . . These circumstances . . . show that 
the conditions imposed by common carriers ought not to be adverse 
. . . to the dictates of public policy and morality.114 
The Court pointed out that exculpation clauses came into vogue among 
carriers who wished to avoid liability for non-chargeable accidents. That is, 
the carriers had at first sought only to avoid liability for pure accidents for 
which they were not responsible. The Court approved of these clauses. The 
difference between the older clauses and this new variety was that the older 
exemptions were just and reasonable because they did not amount to an 
abandonment of the carrier’s obligations to the public.115 The Court 
recognized that standardized forms were being used to effect a change: 
Conceding, therefore, that special contracts, made by common 
carriers with their customers, limiting their liability, are good and 
valid so far as they are just and reasonable; to the extent, for 
example, of excusing them for all losses happening by accident, 
                                                                                                                 
parties of equal bargaining power, dealing at arm’s length, could validly contract so as to exempt 
one party from liability for negligence to the other. Here, a tank steamer owner entered into a 
contract with a tugboat owner, whereby the tugboat owner agreed to supply tugs to take the 
steamer through a certain stretch of water to its destination. The Court found it determinative that 
this was an arm’s-length transaction between parties of equal bargaining power, and that the 
steamer owner was not under any compulsion to accept the terms of the contract. Id. 
 111. Lockwood, 84 U.S. at 379–85. 
 112. Id. at 379. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 379–80. The Court concluded that the railroad’s obligations were akin to that of a 
fiduciary and thus it was charged with a duty to ensure that its contracts with the public were “just 
and reasonable.” Id. From there it was a short step to the holding that the carrier could not in 
justice and reasonableness exculpate itself for negligence. Id. at 384. 
 115. Id. at 381. 
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without any negligence or fraud on their part; when they ask to go 
still further and to be excused for negligence, an excuse so 
repugnant to the law of their foundation and to the public good, 
they have no longer any plea of justice or reason to support such a 
stipulation, but the contrary. And then, the inequality of the parties, 
the compulsion under which the customer is placed, and the 
obligations of the carrier to the public, operate with full force to 
divest the transaction of validity.116 
Lockwood provides an excellent analogy for how the Court ought to 
evaluate compulsory arbitration clauses. Just as is true of exculpatory 
clauses like the one at issue in Lockwood, courts should be able to consider 
arbitration clauses in their individual contexts, and ask about the fairness of 
the respective deals as a whole. This requires more court involvement than 
simply severing the arbitration clause and making an automatic referral to 
the arbitrator. It is also likely to require a court, in evaluating the deal’s 
overall fairness, to consider other norms, which may be difficult to 
reconcile with the federal policy favoring arbitration above all else. 
A. COMPETING NORMS: ADHESION AND UNCONSCIONABILITY 
VERSUS THE LIMITED REMEDY OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION 
Fostering arbitration was the main federal goal of the FAA, but there 
were other policies recognized by the federal courts, Congress and the states 
at the time of the Act’s passage. These other norms were competitive with, 
if not hostile to, arbitration.117 They were hostile to the extent that 
compulsory arbitration clauses had the effect of limiting litigants’ available 
remedies, whereas other norms and policies tended to broaden the remedies. 
The development of these norms shows an implicit policy favoring 
consumer protection. 
Adhesion and unconscionability can be major palliatives of this tension. 
If used properly, adhesion and unconscionability are less manipulative and 
therefore present less of a risk of abuse than doctrines such as duress, the 
pre-existing duty rule and misunderstanding. They can also be better used 
to avoid the manipulations by litigants and courts who wish to avoid the 
arbitration mandated by the FAA.118 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Lockwood, 84 U.S. at 381–82. 
 117. Cases such as Lockwood, with its focus on equality of bargaining power, illustrate one 
such norm. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 118. Manipulation is a danger with doctrines so closely allied. One court has stated, “[t]he fact 
that a contract is an adhesion contract is significant to determining whether it is procedurally 
unconscionable, but [is] ‘not dispositive of this point.’” Pritchard v. Dent Wizard Int’l Corp., 275 
F. Supp. 2d 903, 917 (S.D. Ohio 2003). Another court has flatly stated that an adhesive contract 
does not necessarily contain unconscionable terms. See Walters v. A.A.A. Waterproofing, Inc., 85 
P.3d 389, 393–94 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). At least one court has more carefully crafted the 
relationship between adhesion and unconscionability: “[T]he danger of an adhesion contract is 
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A California case will help better fix the roles of adhesion and 
unconscionability in constraining the limitation of remedies inherent in 
compulsory arbitration. Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare 
Services, Inc.119 began as a complaint by two employees claiming wrongful 
termination by their employer on account of their sexual preferences.120 
Armendariz and a co-worker were hired in 1995.121 Both employees filled 
out and signed application forms, which contained a compulsory arbitration 
clause for any future claim of wrongful termination.122 A provision making 
it compulsory to arbitrate any such claim was also set forth in a separate 
agreement, which termed the agreement to arbitrate, “a condition of my 
employment.”123 The agreement further provided that this remedy precluded 
all others “including but not limited to reinstatement.”124 Significantly, the 
employer was not similarly constrained.125 What the employees basically 
received was employment in return for a severe restriction on their usual 
common-law remedies while the employer had to give nothing up (other 
than payment, presumably) for their services. 
The Armendariz Court applied well-developed California principles of 
adhesion and unconscionability to reach the conclusion that the compulsory 
arbitration clause failed because of contractual weaknesses. Its application 
of those common-law principles and doctrines was no more than an 
evenhanded extension of the general law into the compulsory arbitration 
setting. Post-Buckeye, however, it is much harder for courts to so 
reasonably act. 
 B. BUCKEYE’S FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE 
NORMS UNDERLYING ADHESION AND THE RESULTING ERIE 
PROBLEM 
The Buckeye insistence on the severability of the arbitration clause as a 
matter of federal substantive law creates a dissonance. Buckeye 
acknowledged that the FAA was intended by Congress to overcome federal 
                                                                                                                 
that it might contain unconscionable clauses, and adhesion contracts are scrutinized to avoid 
enforcement of unconscionable clauses.” Faber v. Menard, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 961, 974 (N.D. 
Iowa 2003). That court goes on to say, however, that “the fact that a contract is one of adhesion 
does not necessarily make it unconscionable or unenforceable under Iowa law.” Id. 
 119. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Serv., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). 
 120. Id. at 674–75. 
 121. Id. at 674. 
 122. Id. at 675. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 675. 
 125. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690–92. The court calls this disparity a lack of “even [a] modicum 
of bilaterality.” Id. at 691 (quoting Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1997)). Perhaps not the most felicitous of phrases, but an adequate description of the deal’s 
complete lack of evenhandedness. 
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judicial resistance to arbitration.126 The Court also conceded that Section 2 
of the FAA embodied a national policy favoring arbitration, but only on an 
equal footing with contract provisions generally.127 
Rather than discuss the analysis of the Buckeye court, however, a very 
recent case deserves examination. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc.128 
presented a procedural posture similar to Southland, as it arose in California 
and applied California substantive law. But unlike Southland, it had 
Buckeye’s elaboration of severability with which to test the California 
common law of adhesion and unconscionability as applied to compulsory 
arbitration agreements. 
1. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc. 
Imagine you are Connie Nagrampa, an entrepreneurial-minded and 
experienced seller and manager in direct marketing.129 You have six years 
of experience and earn about $100,000 per year working for one 
company,130 but you are approached by a competitor to become a franchisee 
of its direct marketing business.131 This new company expects a franchisee 
to recruit businesses and advertise the franchisee’s services and products 
through the direct mailers’ coupons.132 Coupons are printed with the 
advertisers’ information and mailed by the direct marketer at its expense to 
households it targets for the service. Readers may receive similar bundles of 
coupons in the mailings typically addressed to “occupants” or “current 
resident.” Such coupons may also say one’s name with an alternative “or 
current addressee.” 
A MailCoups representative approaches you, encourages your 
participation, and offers a notebook tailored to your franchise area, 
including a spreadsheet with expected costs and profits.133 You are 
impressed by a suggested 41% rate of return on investment and when you 
contact the representative this rate of return is confirmed as “about right.”134 
Within months you sign a thirty-page franchise agreement for a ten-year 
term.135 The agreement includes an arbitration provision less than a page in 
length, which requires you to arbitrate all disputes, but allows MailCoups to 
protect its service marks in court.136 Both parties are bound to arbitration 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 129. See id. at 1265. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. See id. at 1265–67. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1265–67. 
 135. See id. 
 136. Id. 
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under the American Arbitration Association rules and the arbitration site is 
to be Boston, Massachusetts.137 
Despite your best efforts, including more than sixty hours per week of 
labor, the business fails.138 You offer to pay “amounts due,” but in short 
order it becomes apparent that this amount is disputed and you will not be 
able to pay MailCoups’ claims.139 
Nagrampa did not seek invalidation of the franchise agreement as a 
whole. She challenged the arbitration provision as unconscionable. In an en 
banc opinion, the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court’s holding that the 
matter should be referred to arbitration.140 
The majority concluded that the trial court could have properly retained 
the case despite the Buckeye rule of severability.141 The majority of judges 
believed that Nagrampa’s six separate causes of action involved allegations 
about the arbitration clause itself rather than the entire contract.142 
Nagrampa’s complaint did not challenge the entire agreement. For the 
majority, the allegations of adhesion and unconscionablity were sufficiently 
particularized to address the clause so that it avoided the Buckeye pitfall.143 
Nagrampa’s first three claims were founded in misrepresentation, fraud, 
and deceit and sought damages as well as attorney’s fees and any other 
relief the court might deem appropriate.144 The fourth cause of action 
claimed violation of California franchise law and sought damages, 
attorney’s fees and other proper remedies.145 The fifth and sixth causes 
challenged the validity and enforceability of the arbitration provision 
itself.146 One of these claims was based on a violation of the California 
Consumer Legal Remedies Act and alleged that the arbitration provision, 
since it was so one-sided that it did not fall from the reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id. at 1266. 
 138. Id. at 1297–98 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
 139. Id. at 1280. 
 140. Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1281. 
 141. Id. at 1284–85. 
 142. Id. at 1281. 
 143. Id. at 1264. MailCoups sought arbitration and made a demand under the contract that 
Nagrampa honor the clause by arbitrating in Los Angeles, California. Id. at 1265. Nagrampa’s 
attorney objected to arbitration. He raised the issue of validity of the arbitration clause, disagreed 
that Nagrampa was bound to arbitrate, and particularly objected to the Los Angeles venue and the 
arbitration fee clause. Id. at 1266. “[T]he arbitrator suggested that arbitration proceed in Fresno, 
California, as a more cost-efficient and convenient venue. MailCoups vigorously objected to the 
Fresno venue, and the AAA case manager confirmed that the arbitration would take place in 
Boston, Massachusetts.” Id. Nagrampa’s response was to file suit against MailCoups in the 
Superior Court of California in Contra Costa County. Id. 
 144. Nagramapa, 469 F.3d at 1266. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
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expectations of Nagrampa, was unduly oppressive, unlawful, or unfair.147 
The other claimed a violation of the California unfair competition law,148 
alleging that Nagrampa, as “a private attorney general,”149 could seek 
MailCoups’ abandonment of its demands for arbitration.150 This cause of 
action was styled as a request for a preliminary and permanent injunction of 
MailCoups to prevent it from unilaterally imposing this arbitration 
provision on Nagrampa.151 
Fairly read, these six causes of action targeted the arbitration clause. 
Not one of them sought a remedy directed at the contract as a whole.152 This 
did not end the controversy, however. In looking at the majority and the 
dissents, a dialogue developed—some might say a dialogue over a matter of 
semantics. The opinion of the author is that there was more substance to the 
argument between the judges. Examining the exchange as a dialogue shines 
a light into the recesses of Buckeye and, in those shadows, spotlights the 
Court’s recent slide toward Erie violations. 
The dialogue is something like this: 
Judge for the Majority (MJ) is seated at a conference table with 
materials spread before him. Dissenting Judge (DJ) enters the room, grabs a 
book off a shelf and says, “If I may interrupt you, I have seen the 
Nagrampa draft and I don’t see how you can accommodate Buckeye. The 
draft seems wrong to me.” 
MJ set aside his notepad and said, “Well, help me out. What’s troubling 
you?” 
DJ pulled out a chair, eased onto it, and said, “I suppose my problem is 
that the opinion does not seem to recognize our limited role. We should not 
be looking at the substance if the arbitration clause is valid.” 
“True,” MJ said, “but we can look at it if there is a problem with the 
clause. The Buckeye line of cases requires the federal court to give the case 
to arbitration if the challenge is to the enforceability of the contract as a 
whole. None of Nagrampa’s challenges are to the contract as a whole; each 
one refers to the arbitration clause. If each is a challenge to the validity of 
the arbitration clause, then the challenges can remain in the federal court 
system.” 
“Exactly,” DJ responded. “Nagrampa said her basis for challenging the 
arbitration clause was unconscionability, so she can’t escape talking about 
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procedural unconscionability, and in California, that warrants an 
examination of her allegations that the contract, not just the clause, was a 
‘take-it-or-leave-it’ deal.153 
“You are confusing California law,” MJ said. “California’s law of 
unconscionability has two elements: procedural and substantive.154 
Nagrampa wanted to use adhesion to establish the procedural part of 
California’s test.155 For the substantive unconscionability element, she 
wanted to prove unfairness of the clause.156 In fact, the threshold inquiry 
under California unconscionability analysis is whether the arbitration 
agreement is adhesive.157 So her challenge was directed at the clause, it just 
had two parts.”158 
DJ said, “You are just saying the ‘crux of the complaint’ is about the 
arbitration clause, but the facts Nagrampa allege go to the formation of the 
entire contract, so Buckeye requires that the claim be submitted to the 
arbitrator.”159 
“No,” MJ said. “That is not what Nagrampa alleges and it is not what 
we are holding. While the facts could entangle the whole contract, the 
plaintiff seeks only to invalidate the arbitration clause.”160 
“But that is exactly the problem,” DJ said. “While you insist that none 
of Nagrampa’s claims would result in invalidity of the entire contract, the 
possibility is the very heart of Buckeye. It is for the arbitrator, not the 
district court, to decide the question of invalidity. And the arbitrator should 
decide it on whether the challenge directly affects the entire contract.”161 
 MJ sighed and said, “No, you are not listening. Nothing in Nagrampa’s 
claims challenged the entire contract because her cause of action did not 
seek to invalidate the entire contract. Anything she said about the entire 
contract was only due to California’s pleading rules requiring her to state 
more facts than one typically sees in the federal courts.162 Because she did 
not make a claim of overall invalidity, it cannot directly affect the overall 
validity.”163 
DJ’s voice took on an edge. “You are the one not listening,” he said. 
“You are not listening to Buckeye and the Supremes. Buckeye drew a 
distinction between two types of challenges. You can have a challenge to 
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 155. Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1281–82. 
 156. Id. at 1284–85. 
 157. Id. at 1281. 
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the contract as a whole or to the arbitration clause, but in cases like this 
both must go to the arbitrator. One is a challenge that directly affects the 
entire agreement and the other challenge is that the provision is illegal or 
otherwise a violation of policy which would invalidate the whole contract. 
What you have tried to do here is collapse them into the category of 
‘seeking invalidation.’ The Court did not do that. The Buckeye opinion uses 
the word ‘challenges’ and only requires that the challenge ‘directly affect’ 
the contract.”164 
“You’re wrong,” MJ said. “Buckeye was a challenge to the entire 
contract as void ab initio on the grounds of usury. It was not a challenge to 
the clause itself so that is dicta, but more importantly the ‘challenge’ has to 
be to validity. You still do not understand that what we have here is not a 
challenge to validity. Nagrampa is utilizing a classic contract doctrine, one 
that applies to contracts generally. She is simply using facts that could have 
been used to challenge the whole, but she is using them to bolster what is a 
limited challenge to the arbitration clause itself. We look at the overall 
transaction to see what went on with the individual clause. That is just basic 
contract law. It’s the kind of thing we are supposed to do as a federal court. 
It’s impossible to avoid if you really want to examine a particular provision 
under general contract law. There was no challenge to the whole. She 
challenged only the arbitration part. None of her causes of action was 
against the whole contract. What you have left out is the parenthetical 
phrase of Section 2 of the FAA. What else could Congress have meant by 
allowing challenges to the arbitration clause on such grounds as apply to the 
contracts generally? Even Buckeye allows ‘challenges [to] the contract as a 
whole, either on a ground that directly affects the entire agreement (e.g., the 
agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the ground that the illegality of 
one of the contract’s provisions renders the whole contract invalid.’”165 
What should DJ have said? 
The dialogue fails at this point because the dissent’s reasoning fails for 
the author. We could extend the liberty already taken and fill in a fictional 
repost, but it seems unnecessary to prove the point. The majority has the 
better argument. As Buckeye stands, the Supreme Court appears to have 
distinguished between ‘challenges’ to the arbitration clause and to the 
contract as a whole. This part was deductive for the Court, though 
counterintuitive. Thus, if a plaintiff alleges a cause of action intended to 
invalidate the whole contract, it must go to the arbitrator. If the cause 
alleges invalidity of the arbitration clause itself, it can stay with the court. 
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This was the holding in Prima Paint and Southland also.166 As a matter of 
substantive federal law, the Court asked the trial court to determine what 
type of challenge was being made, and if the challenge was to both, to sever 
the clause.167 
The nuance added by the Buckeye court was a refusal to let the Florida 
Supreme Court use classic contract doctrine. The Buckeye court held that 
even if the challenge amounted to one that would invalidate the contract, ab 
initio (that is, make it void and not simply voidable), then the Court should 
have sent the matter to the arbitrator to consider. The Court made it clear 
that any state court rule about nonseverability was overridden by the FAA’s 
implicit substantive rule demanding severability.168 What it did not address 
is a situation like that in Nagrampa, where when the facts indicate overall 
adhesion and unconscionability, the state law would appear to allow a 
challenge to the individual clause based on infirmities of bargaining and 
then the challenge is only to that clause.  In other words, there was nothing 
to sever in Nagrampa unless the federal court reconstructed the complaint 
as one that challenged the overall contract. This, the majority was not 
willing to do, but it appears the dissenters were.169 
2. The Insidious Erie Effect of Buckeye 
Cases like Nagrampa are likely to proliferate.170 What was a logical 
deduction from prior FAA cases became an insidious troublemaker in 
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 170. See, e.g., Brown v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 384, 396 (5th Cir. 2006); Wash. Mut. Fin. 
Group, LLC v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2004); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
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Buckeye. The conclusion in Buckeye was that, because the plaintiff 
“challenge[ed] the Agreement, but not specifically its arbitration provisions, 
those provisions [were] enforceable apart from the remainder of the 
contract.”171 Florida’s attempt to avoid this conclusion by referencing 
Florida’s common law, making the entire contract void, was “simply 
rejected.”172 The Court acknowledged what might appear to be an anomaly: 
The rule allows a court to enforce an arbitration clause, send the matter to 
arbitration and have the arbitrator invalidate the entire contract on a 
common-law ground. The Court believed Prima Paint and its brethren 
cases resolved this “conundrum” in favor of enforcement of the arbitration 
provision. The arbitration agreement was to be vindicated even if the 
contract bargain, as a whole ultimately (after submission to arbitration) 
would not be preserved.173 
Here is the Erie issue: The question of severability will now turn on a 
federal court’s view of state common law. Erie does not prohibit federal 
courts from having a role in the development of the common law. What 
Erie stands for is that as a matter of the constitutional principles of 
federalism, the federal courts should not create or develop a freestanding 
common law, one distinct from, and therefore unsupported by, the state 
authorities which legitimize the common law.174 States have autonomy and 
independence as a constitutional matter. The content and development of 
state law is vested with the state legislatures and judiciary and no 
interference with either should be tolerated except when concerning matters 
specially authorized by the Constitution.175 Most particularly, there is no 
“transcendent body of law outside of any particular state.”176 Instead, the 
common law, so far as it is enforced in a state, is not the common law 
generally, but that of the particular State and the authority for it must, in the 
final analysis, lie with the State’s legislature and courts.177 By applying the 
Court’s notions of federal policy and what constitutes severability in 
contract actions to state court proceedings, the Southland and Buckeye 
courts slipped over the Erie edge. 
The Court’s holding in Southland really emphasizes this problem. In 
that case, the Court held that challenges to the validity of the arbitration 
agreement, even though they were of state-court origin, would be subject to 
the Prima Paint rule.178 Insofar as claims were made under California law 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 446. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 448–49. 
 174. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1937). 
 175. Id. at 79. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1983). 
26 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
 
concerning this, those claims would be tested using the two-part test of 
Prima Paint. What happens next is a dichotomy. One branch leads to a flat 
conclusion that there is no evidence that Congress did not intend to affect 
state as well as federal court proceedings, as occurred in Southland179 and 
Buckeye,180 because Congress has the power to regulate interstate 
commerce.  The other branch is the one the author suggests here. It is an 
alternative that is more sensitive to Erie and its teachings about the federal-
state relationship. 
When a suit is commenced in state court and removed on the basis of 
diversity, the federal court is the forum. However, the law should remain 
that of the state of removal, with consideration given to choice-of-law 
issues. By extending the FAA policy to reach state court proceedings, the 
Southland case impacted more than federal substantive law; it insidiously 
affected the common law’s development. It urged an adoption or creation of 
something akin to a federal common law of contracts. In this way Southland 
worked far greater changes than those initially contemplated by Congress, 
which had intended to limit the FAA’s effects to federal court 
proceedings.181 
What the Court appears to have meant, at least with its holding in 
Prima Paint, is that to accomplish Congress’ goal of encouraging 
enforcement of freely bargained arbitration clauses, courts must ferret out 
illegitimate claims of unenforceability and the most obvious are those that 
attack the entire contract.182 The Court should have made reference to Erie 
and urged state courts and the federal trial courts sitting within a forum as 
courts of citizen-diversity to apply the state doctrines of severability. How 
this zone of deference works can be seen if we adjust and reinvigorate the 
Court’s statement about ‘separability’ with infusions of the longer-standing 
common law of ‘severability.’183 
What the Court announced was a useful tool designed to accomplish a 
real goal, but it was not in line with substantive law. The substantive rule 
was the one contained in the FAA mandate to treat compulsory arbitration 
on equal footing with all other contract provisions. However, the Court 
gives the tool a gloss of “federal substantive law.”184 I would be more 
sanguine about the damage to state common law doctrine if Congress had 
stated that, as a congressional finding of fact, it was a necessity of interstate 
regulation of commerce that arbitration clauses be severed if attacked on 
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grounds of adhesion or unconscionability.185 However, Congress made no 
such statement or findings. 
If this doctrine of separability, announced in Prima Paint and 
elaborated in its progeny, did not come from Congress, then it is a creature 
of the Court. As such, it must be seen for what it is: a zombie orphan of the 
discredited Swift v. Tyson federal common law, and a direct violation of 
Erie. If the Court had drawn on state-court doctrines of severability, it could 
have legitimized the Buckeye doctrine by framing it within the zone of state 
common law, specifically that of Florida.186 Instead, the Court states that 
the rule of severability arises from “the FAA’s substantive command that 
arbitration agreements be treated like all other contracts.”187 It was Florida 
doctrine that void contracts are not to be salvaged, and even individual parts 
that are otherwise valid are not to be enforced.188 Relying on Prima Paint, 
the Court rejected this notion, again on the basis of the federal substantive 
rule drawn from the FAA.189 
The Court is so focused on the need to sever, it does not address the 
illogical position that the FAA requires the same treatment for all contracts, 
yet under Florida law, the contract would receive the same exact treatment: 
a refusal to sever. What the Court’s holding amounts to, therefore, is more 
than a mandate for equal treatment. By dictating what will be the Florida 
version of severability, the Prima Paint/Southland/Buckeye rule saves the 
compulsory arbitration clause where any other contract term would be void, 
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making the treatment of contracts with compulsory arbitration clauses quite 
unequal. 
While the Court’s focus on the policy of the FAA can be lauded for its 
support of that Act’s norms, it should be questioned for its lack of concern 
for Erie principles. What makes the need for some zone of deference urgent 
is the context of diversity cases. In a diversity case, such as Nagrampa,190 
there is more to the Erie problem: 
[Thirty-five] years after the passage of the Arbitration Act, the 
Second Circuit completely rewrote it. Under its new formulation, § 
2 now makes arbitration agreements enforceable “save upon such 
grounds as exist at federal law for the revocation of any contract.” 
And under § 4, before enforcing an arbitration agreement, the 
district court must be satisfied that “the making of the agreement 
for arbitration, as a matter of federal law, is not in issue.” . . . Judge 
Medina . . . formulated the separability rule . . . because of his 
notion that the separability rule would further a “liberal policy of 
promoting arbitration.”191 
Southland and Buckeye exacerbated the Erie problem. If Justice Black 
saw Prima Paint as a kind of heresy, then recent cases represent lunatic 
heresy. What was said in Prima Paint affected the federal court’s view of 
the law and would have resulted in different interpretations of the 
substantive doctrine of severability depending on the courthouse in which 
one filed suit.192 With these later cases the Court is not only affecting the 
interpretation of federal substantive law, it is using this weak reed to force 
the state courts to rewrite substantive common law. The severability rule 
urged by the Court in Buckeye is a controversial doctrine at the least, and in 
most states will simply be contrary to settled principles of law. State courts 
will have to change the common law or introduce an Erie-specific fix for 
matters involving compulsory arbitration clauses. This remedy would 
provide for severability in those cases, but recognize that the doctrine 
would be quite different from the severability rules found, generally, in 
contracts and specifically, in adhesion and unconscionability cases. 
The Court could have, at any step along its current course, limited the 
Erie impact of its strategy to foster voluntary bargains leading to 
arbitration. First, it could have resisted the impulse to extend the reach of 
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the FAA beyond the limited commerce cases suggested by the Act’s 
history. This was too late after Prima Paint in 1967. Next it could have 
chosen not to extend the reach of the FAA to state-court proceedings. This 
was too late after the Southland case of 1983. Finally, it might have limited 
Southland’s reach by recognizing common-law voidness arguments. This 
was too late after Buckeye and the Court’s rejection of Florida doctrine on 
voidness as a reason not to refer. 
Buckeye and its progenitors have left us with the very broadest 
construction of the FAA’s purpose and scope. Even voidness ab initio will 
not suffice as a ground on which all contracts can be challenged, and 
therefore ought to be available under Section 2 of the Act. There are three 
responses. The most consistent with the developments so far is for the Court 
to follow the lead of the dissent in Nagrampa.193 The Court could, in the 
next opportune case, conclude that the severability rule requires that any 
semblance of a challenge to the whole contract will be taken in that vein, 
without regard to the actual remedy sought or cause of action stated. It 
could even be more draconian and add that challenges that require inquiries 
into the facts surrounding the entire contract amount to a challenge of the 
full contract even though the style of the pleading asserts only invalidity of 
the arbitration clause. The Nagrampa majority opinion suggests a distinct 
lack of desire to go this route, however. 
The Nagrampa majority distinguished Connie Nagrampa’s allegations 
from those in Buckeye. The Nagrampa opinion recognized that Buckeye had 
already rejected common law severability rules and that it had held that the 
enforceability of an arbitration agreement could not turn on state policy and 
contract law. The majority knew that any conclusion that the contract in 
Nagrampa was void would achieve no purpose, given the Buckeye holding. 
Buckeye made it plain that an attack on the contract as a whole, even if it 
leads to a conclusion that the contract was void ab initio, should be referred 
to the arbitrator.194 The Court also recognized that there was the potential 
for the manipulation in the Buckeye line of cases.195 The remedy offered by 
the majority was to hold that Nagrampa’s challenges were consistently 
directed at the arbitration clause alone.196 In their view, her challenges never 
approached a claim concerning the whole contract, not even one alleging 
voidness.197 
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Having concluded that the challenge was to the arbitration provision 
itself, the Nagrampa court articulated the California rule based on 
California precedent.198 The court said that California analyzes contract 
provisions for both procedural and substantive unconscionability. It is true 
that the California law on unconscionability in adhesion is complex, but this 
is only the beginning of the dispute between the majority and dissent. 
California law handles adhesion and unconscionability in its own, perhaps 
peculiar, way, as can be seen in the California case of Armendariz.199 The 
California Supreme Court in Armendariz held that it could legitimately 
consider the compulsory arbitration provision, which the court then deemed 
unconscionable on the basis of California precedent.200 
The Nagrampa majority correctly pointed out that in California, 
adhesion is a threshold inquiry for an unconscionability analysis.201 This is 
a bit of an oversimplification. Adhesion—under California law—signifies 
only that a standardized contract has been imposed by a party of superior 
bargaining strength, and that the subscribing party had the choice to adhere 
or reject, but was not in a position to bargain.202 Thus in California, as in 
most states, adhesion does not automatically destroy an agreement; rather 
the court must also find the presence of other factors which render it 
unenforceable.203 
California recognizes two bases for refusing to enforce an adhesive 
deal. The first is that the contract includes a term or terms that are outside of 
the adhering party’s reasonable expectations.204 The second is that either the 
contract as a whole or an individual provision is unconscionable.205 The 
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California courts appear to equate the terms “unconscionable” and 
“oppressive” even though unconscionability has its roots in equity, and 
oppression appears to be a statement about the lack of a voice in the 
exchange.206 California law—drawn from its case law, the U.C.C. and other 
legislative mandates—allows a California court to find the contract as a 
whole, or any provision of it, unconscionable.207 At least through 
Armendariz, California courts believed it would be possible to invalidate a 
particular provision of the contract on the basis of unconscionability, even 
if some of the unconscionability analysis was based on the bargaining and 
setting of the contract as a whole.208 
This understanding of California law was critical to Nagrampa, where 
the Court decided that California law controlled in that diversity action.209 
Let us return to the majority/dissent dialogue: 
DJ started to rise from his chair, obviously a bit miffed. MJ gestured for 
him to stay and said, “Wait. Please give me a second to explain why we 
need to keep the case in court.” 
Slowly settling back onto the edge of his chair DJ said, “What you need 
to explain is why a court is the more appropriate place for an attack on the 
contract.” 
MJ paused and said, “MailCoups concedes that the contract was non-
negotiable and that Connie Nagrampa’s only choice was to sign it or make 
no franchise deal. Under California law, a contract of adhesion is either 
inherently oppressive and therefore automatically procedurally 
unconscionable, or there is a separate element of oppression needed to cast 
it as procedurally unconscionable.210 So, all we need is to find some 
oppressiveness and no matter which is true this contract is procedurally 
unconscionable.”211 
DJ said, “Well, the problem with that is you are looking at the context 
of the full contract, and nearly all our sister circuits agree that any argument 
about unconscionability must be directed to the arbitration clause, not the 
entire contract.212 The FAA does not allow a federal court to consider 
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claims alleging that the contract, as a whole, is adhesive. Those are for the 
arbitrator.”213 
“But that misstates California law,” MJ responded. “California looks at 
adhesion only as a part of unconscionability. For the court to declare a 
contract unconscionable, the court must find some proportion of procedural 
unconscionability and substantive unconscionability together. It’s unclear 
how much, but it is a sliding scale. Some of each is required to invalidate 
the deal, so any court wishing to follow the California common law must 
consider procedural unconscionability. If procedural unconscionability is in 
large part adhesion then it means the court—not the arbitrator—needs to 
look at the circumstances of the bargain.”214 
“But I don’t buy Nagrampa’s claim that the arbitration clause was 
procedurally unconscionable,” DJ said. “The whole argument that the 
clause was adhesive assumes that this sophisticated business person simply 
failed to read the contract. Or, even worse, that she did not have to 
understand the import of a clause that clearly required her to arbitrate in 
Massachusetts.215 And even if we buy that argument, there is no showing 
that the clause itself is grossly unfair.216 What’s the big deal about spending 
a couple thousand dollars to take a nice trip to Boston and state her case? I 
don’t mind staying at a La Quinta Inn. I saw Rachel Ray’s show on Boston. 
$40 a day is enough for some good food. What’s the hardship?”217 
“The big deal is that these are matters a court must consider to comply 
with California law,” MJ responded. “To decide whether the arbitration 
clause was unconscionable, it has to look at substance and procedure.218 
More importantly, these are matters that require an examination of how the 
provisions were reached, because you have to have both substantive and 
procedural elements to find unconscionability. So even though there is not 
much evidence of procedural unconscionability in the making of the 
contract, there is enough if the court finds an offsetting amount of 
substantive unconscionability in the arbitration term.”219 
“There you go repeating the error again,” DJ replied. “You insist on 
using evidence of the overall bargaining to attack the arbitration clause. 
Show me the specific challenge to the arbitration clause based on the 
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bargaining that occurred. If you can’t talk about the clause without talking 
about the whole contract, then you are violating Buckeye. 
“She has to attack the arbitration clause with specificity, and every time 
she mentions procedure, she mentions the setting and process of the entire 
agreement, not the clause itself.”220 
Here is where the opinion fails, as neither side ever reaches the Erie 
concerns. Let us continue with the dialogue in a wholly speculative 
extension of the arguments so that the real issue is broached. 
MJ said, “See you are not listening again. I am using procedural 
unconscionability for the whole contract because the clause was not 
individually bargained for. How am I supposed to attack an individual 
process that does not exist?” 
DJ smiled and said, “Bingo.” 
MJ said, “OK, but what does ‘bingo’ mean? Are you saying that a court 
can never use the contractual setting and bargaining process to attack the 
arbitration clause?” 
DJ said, “Yes, if what that amounts to is a challenge to the contract as a 
whole, then Buckeye and all our sister circuits agree that we must send it to 
the arbitrator for decision.” 
MJ said, “Suppose for a minute you are the lawyer for Connie 
Nagrampa and you have the job of deciding whether to arbitrate or file suit. 
If it will be more expensive to arbitrate in Boston than to sue locally, and 
money is an issue, how do you frame the issue so that you can stay in court 
in Contra Costa County?” 
DJ asked, “So you want me to pretend I am representing Nagrampa and 
you want me to find a way to stay in local court. Suppose I just say that it is 
not possible?” 
MJ said, “But even Buckeye leaves open the possibility of severing the 
claims. Why are you not willing to try?” 
DJ said, “I don’t want to try because I don’t see how her claim 
regarding the arbitration clause can be separated from any claim she might 
have involving the whole contract. If I do try to remove the arbitration 
clause alone, maybe it will preclude my claims relating to the whole 
contract. It seems to me that res judicata could preclude me if I miss on this 
one clause, so if I really care about representing her, then maybe I should go 
to Boston and arbitrate the whole thing like my client agreed to in the first 
place.” 
MJ said, “I think we are making progress. The similarity in facts raises 
the concerns about claim preclusion and res judicata, right?” 
DJ said, “I suppose so. . . . yes . . . I will go along with that. It seems to 
me that her real claim is that the contract is invalid because she did not like 
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the result and would like to escape it, but claiming only that the arbitration 
clause was invalid may use up her chances to attack it.” 
“If you were to reword your concerns,” MJ said, “And if you said that 
you wanted only to ‘challenge’ the arbitration clause, how would you do 
so? Remember, you need to look at the facts of the whole contract, but 
cannot claim the invalidity of the whole deal. Would you be able to?” 
DJ said, “If I understand your question, the answer is ‘no.’ The fact that 
I could have argued the whole deal was invalid but I did not challenge it 
was the very basis for claim preclusion and res judicata. Pleading the facts 
surrounding the arbitration clause legitimately raised the facts surrounding 
the whole.” 
MJ said, “Then just consider what Erie demands. We must permit a 
‘challenge’ to the arbitration clause in this case. Think about the word 
‘severable’ and ask yourself where the Court got it. It is not part of the 
statute. It was never mentioned in the legislative history. It appears to have 
been a logical deduction in the Bernhardt221 case thirty-five years after the 
Act was passed. It was added to the gloss of the statute long before it was 
even considered a possibility that the FAA applied in state-court actions. So 
it was no big deal for the Court to add some substantive gloss about a 
statute applied in federal litigation only by the federal courts. But Buckeye 
really forces us to step into a mess. That word which, by the way, was once 
‘separability’ has become ‘severability’ and applies now in state court 
cases.” 
“So what?” DJ interrupted. “That’s all settled at this point. I hope you 
are not trying to overturn Buckeye, because the last I checked, the Supremes 
have the final say on what a federal statute means. If they want gloss, they 
can have gloss.” 
MJ waved this off and said, “But can they have gloss that amounts to a 
rule that affects common-law doctrine where its authority does not come 
from the common law itself?” 
“Sure they can—if it is a constitutional limitation or is a congressional 
mandate based on the authority of Congress to regulate commerce,” DJ 
said. 
MJ pursued, “What if the effect is not only to regulate commerce, but to 
impose a shift in common-law doctrine?” 
“What do you mean?” DJ asked. 
“Buckeye does not just regulate commerce,” MJ answered. “‘According 
to the dictates of Congress’ means ‘according to the gloss of the Court,’ as 
you conceded with the severability test. That gloss has to have a source. 
Where does this notion of ‘separability,’ or ‘severability’ or whatever you 
call it come from if Congress did not ask for it?” 
                                                                                                                 
 221. See supra notes 3, 7 and accompanying text. 
2007] Prima Paint and Compulsory Arbitration 35 
 
“Well, I am not a historian,” DJ answered, “and I don’t recall a citation 
by the Court as to its source. My best recollection is that the Second Circuit, 
maybe Judge Medina, in an old opinion,222 first suggested it as the way to 
ensure that the court did not abuse the policy of the Act by skirting the issue 
to attack the contract as a whole.” 
MJ said, “So you will concede that it sounds suspiciously like the 
severability doctrine familiar to us in the context of common law and 
equitable doctrines of severing one clause of the contract to save the 
rest?”223 
DJ shrugged, “Sure, I agree it always seemed vaguely familiar and 
contractual; those are some of its strengths to me.” 
MJ continued, “So what we have is a vague common-law doctrine with 
a purpose to do federal, substantive duty, but in the end its impact is to do 
away with common-law doctrines such as the ‘void’ and ‘voidable’ 
distinction nixed in Buckeye and the adhesion and unconscionability 
distinctions that you would like to have disappear in this case. Well, my 
friend, it sounds like federal common law. It’s being used like a general 
federal common law to radically rewrite state law. To me that is a general 
federal common law. It is Swift v. Tyson all over again and a grave violation 
of the Erie doctrine.” 
DJ paused and then said, “OK, not to concede the point but let’s just 
take for granted an Erie concern; what is the harm in allowing the Court to 
dictate the content of a common-law rule like severability if it is using it for 
a good purpose?” 
MJ said, “If you mean ‘what harm other than having the common law 
depend on whether the contract contains an arbitration clause and what we 
as federal judges think the rule of law should be,’ I am not sure. But that 
seems to me a pretty substantial impact. By what right do we ignore 
California’s law that an unconscionable contract is a nullity. The California 
courts have said that even conscionable individual provisions should not be 
saved where the whole is void?224 Seems to be enough of an Erie concern to 
me that we ought to find a way to avoid creating separate bodies of law 
based on courthouse and pleading happenstance. It certainly should not 
depend on the Court saying what it thinks the common law of 
unconscionability ought to be just to add gloss to a federal statute.” 
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Not liking where the discussion was headed, DJ said, “As I suggested 
earlier, you just want to reargue the void/voidable distinction that Buckeye 
ended.” 
“Well, I thought we were rethinking that as part of a friendly 
discussion,” MJ responded, “but that is not my main point.” 
“You can get there any time, as far as I am concerned,” DJ smirked. 
“Well, I think rewriting common-law contracts every time an 
arbitration clause comes before the Supreme Court is problematic enough, 
but let me try to show you a real world effect: 
“Go back for a second to that other cause of action Connie Nagrampa 
might have brought. You remember: the one challenging the whole 
contract. We need to preserve that second cause of action concerning the 
contract as a whole and the only way to do that is to take either challenge 
she may have.225 So long as they are pled in the alternative we ought to 
retain both. We need to do that to prevent res judicata problems. 
“I think that Connie Nagrampa was more of a gambler than I would 
have been. She did not challenge the contract as a whole. Every one of her 
six causes of action went to the clause itself. But to plead the facts to upset 
the arbitration clause, she had to plead the facts that could have, and I 
emphasize could have, been used in an attack on the contract as a whole. 
But she did not make that attack. As you pointed out, any lawyer worth his 
salt will see the overlap of facts and see that pleading one necessitates 
pleading the other or risking claim preclusion.226 Then as long as the 
complaint is limited to a claim that the arbitration clause itself is invalid, 
her gamble will pay off only if we keep this action.” 
“So she was stupid or her lawyer committed malpractice,” DJ said. 
“Buckeye does not allow us to cover for the mistakes of the plaintiff’s bar. 
We should refer her to arbitration.” 
“But don’t you see another possibility?” MJ asked. “Suppose honesty 
instead of incompetence. Suppose they really did believe in the overall 
contract. Maybe she really did see that she was bound to pay something. 
She did offer to settle before she realized how much they wanted and how 
little she had left. Maybe she really was willing to talk about the meaning of 
the contract and had no desire to attack its overall enforceability. 
“If she really only had a beef against the arbitration provision, then she 
should have attacked only it and she might have risked claim preclusion 
over the entire contract. Maybe she was willing to take the risk in order to 
litigate locally. Maybe it really was about avoiding the expense and 
perceived unfairness of arbitration. If so, we owe it to her to allow the 
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specific complaint even if it requires sifting through facts that go to the 
making of the contract as a whole.” 
DJ said, “Maybe this; maybe that. That is all speculation and it seems to 
me that Buckeye requires us not to speculate, but to liberally construe the 
arbitration policy. I would refer any case where the facts alleged a challenge 
to the whole contract.” 
MJ said, “Well I just disagree then because now you are confusing the 
word ‘challenge’ with the phrase ‘raise facts which could lead to a 
challenge of.’ She did the second, not the first.” 
DJ said, “I think that I finally see your point on that one, but we will 
disagree about the conclusion. She may have been challenging only the 
arbitration clause, and to do that meant she had to raise facts that could have 
been used to challenge the whole contract. It may be that California law 
even requires her to raise those facts to make her allegations about 
procedural and substantive unconscionability law viable. But that’s because 
California law is worse than murky. Don’t you agree?” 
[MJ nods to this.] 
DJ continued, “But just as Buckeye extended the idea of Southland, I 
think this case, were it to go to the Court, would be the vehicle to extend 
Buckeye.” 
MJ asked, “So where do you see that extension going? 
DJ settled in, gazing toward the ceiling and said, “Well no one has 
asked about my interest in being elevated to the Show, but if I were on the 
Court and this case came up I would extend Buckeye. I think the FAA and 
similar tools are needed. We need to rein in these frivolous claims of 
contract unfairness. And we have too much litigation in this Circuit 
anyway. It would be useful to refer more of it to arbitration. So, I would 
take the next opportunity to hold that the severability rule requires that any 
semblance of a challenge to the whole contract will be taken in that vein 
without regard to the actual remedy sought or cause of action stated. It 
could even be more draconian. I might add that challenges that require 
factual inquiries into context or setting of the entire contract are per se 
challenges to the full contract. I might also throw in an inquiry into the 
waiver doctrine and make almost any contact with the arbitration forum an 
additional basis to deny the parties their chance to stay in court.” 
“Wow,” MJ said. “How about a middle ground? Maybe altering the 
severance doctrine? Could we allow court attacks on the arbitration clause 
if and only if the attack is clearly addressed at that one clause, even though 
the facts would have supported a broader attack? I know it’s a pretty limited 
pleading strategy, but at least it would allow the litigants and the state 
courts to decide the effect of severing.” 
“No,” DJ said. “That is too close to reverting to something like a writ-
pleading system, an ugly system of civil procedure. I know Erie allows a 
38 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 2 
 
good deal of discretion in adopting procedural rules in federal court, but 
that seems to require the states to adopt or respond with changes to their 
pleading systems and they would be peculiar to contract law, maybe even 
peculiar to contracts containing compulsory arbitration clauses. I believe in 
the federal/state division of responsibility. We already have too much 
federal activism. 
“So, no. No middle ground yet. You’re going to have to convince me 
that Buckeye does not demand a referral in this case.” 
MJ paused, “OK. It’s a bit abstract, but you have to start with a basic 
hypo: Suppose that Nagrampa came into court and alleged that the 
MailCoups representative showed up at her house and held a gun on her 
until she signed the contract. The contract she was shown was twenty-three 
pages long and there was not chance to read or think—it was ‘Sign, or 
die.’” 
“Good grief, you sound like a law teacher steeped in the common law 
to the point your tweeds have all turned brown,” DJ snickered. “But to 
answer your question, that is a fraud in the factum or extortion defense227 
that would void the whole . . . deal. . . .” DJ trailed off. 
“But Buckeye appears not to allow a court to examine the contract, even 
if it’s extortionate. The extortion challenge is still to the whole contract,” 
MJ finished for DJ. [DJ stares with a sinking expression.] MJ continues, 
“So Buckeye’s gloss of severability does more than prevent challenges 
based on the void/voidability distinction. It ends all court challenges to the 
contract as a whole even in the presence of outrages such as physical duress 
and worse. 
“Buckeye allows you to take a nullity, legally a nothing in California 
and probably every other state, and once you sever it, once you deduct it 
from the whole, you have something that can be saved. I am sorry, but that 
is simply ridiculous.228 Surely you would not say that the extorted deal I 
posited for you should have any life breathed into it. The only way it gets to 
an arbitrator is on its own terms. No common-law rule would demand 
arbitration of the question of enforceability of the whole deal. That is the 
Erie problem. Without Buckeye and its severability rule, the place to 
challenge the deal or any part of the deal is in court. There is no neutral rule 
of the common law that would send the deal to the arbitrator. In every case 
where the whole contract is void, allowing the arbitrator to examine the deal 
is not only recognition, but vindication of the clause. The wrongdoer gets 
exactly what he sought with that particular term.” 
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“But tell me what you would do then, without challenging Buckeye, 
because I am not going there,” said DJ. “It seems unfair that I am the only 
one who has to come up with a good idea.” 
MJ thought for several moments and said, “I know you won’t like it, 
but I think Erie is the key. I don’t like where we are headed. Reading the 
old cases, I have always been uncomfortable so I admit I don’t like the 
current state of the law and especially don’t like how Buckeye extended the 
old cases. I think Frankfurter and Black would be apoplectic if they weren’t 
already dead. But here is where Buckeye has to be limited at least. The 
Buckeye rule only has simplicity in its favor. Its downside is that the federal 
courts are already, through severability, dictating common-law pleading 
systems and encouraging a radical rewrite of unconscionability and 
adhesion. By taking the arbitration clause out of its context as part of a 
bargained-for exchange, the Court is giving it greater validity than we give 
to the contract itself. The bargain itself is being radically shifted to 
accommodate a gloss by the Court. That gloss is forcing the adoption of a 
different set of common-law doctrines. 
“The Court could limit the Buckeye case to its facts. Instead of creating 
a series of rules that address particular common-law doctrines such as the 
‘void/voidable’ distinction, we should give deference to the state courts and 
their expertise in contract formation. The Court could offer a test that 
demands an examination of the good faith and reasonable scope of the 
pleadings and the trial court’s findings. If a trial court, whether federal or 
state, determines that the challenge is being made in good faith and is 
reasonably intended to place into controversy the arbitration clause’s 
validity as a separate matter, then the court can retain the case. 
“Then only where it is a bad-faith plea, one that seeks to color itself as a 
challenge to the arbitration clause but in fact is a challenge to the whole 
contract and has no reasonable chance of success as a challenge to the 
clause, should the case be referred. This is the kind of test that district 
courts are used to dealing with.” 
DJ chuckled, “Dreamer. That pretty much proves it. I am a lot closer to 
elevation to the Court than you will ever be.” Continuing to chuckle, he 
rose and exited the conference room. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Court should limit the Buckeye case to its facts. Although the FAA 
expresses an important federal norm and even though that norm could be 
interpreted in such a way that would limit common-law contractual 
constraints, the Court should resist this temptation. As it now stands, the 
Buckeye line gives no deference to the state courts and their expertise in 
contract formation. While Nagrampa and similar Buckeye progeny could be 
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used to strengthen the notion of contract severability, the Court should 
resist this temptation. 
A reversal of Buckeye is unnecessary. What is needed is an examination 
of the Erie principles and recognition that the Court has allowed the FAA 
norms to place its holdings in the interstices of the Erie doctrine. 
An Erie zone of deference prevents federal courts from expressing rules 
that have the effect of a federal common law, rules which improperly 
displace the true common law. A trial court should be given the opportunity 
to examine the challenges to the agreement and determine the likelihood of 
success on the merits of a challenge to the arbitration clause alone. It should 
conduct this review in the context of the state’s common law limits on 
contracts. Only where it is a bad-faith plea, one seeking to color itself as a 
challenge to the arbitration clause but which in fact is a challenge to the 
validity of the contract as a whole, should the case be referred. History 
shows that adhesion and unconscionability have an important role to play in 
contracts, even if a contract contains a compulsory arbitration provision. An 
Erie zone of deference for basic contract principles would prevent a 
constitutional problem without significant impact on Congress’s intention 
to foster arbitration. 
